The panel will focus on the distinction between the requirements that we see in today's secure systems and the requirements that will be needed for survivable systems.
For example, it seems likely that new requirements will be needed for resistance, recognition, and recovery from intrusions, and that requirements notations will need to identify subsets of functional requirements that must survive attacks. Issues that the panel will address include:
• What are the principal issues in defining survivability requirements?
• How can business risks and vulnerabilities be translated into survivability requirements?
• What is different about survivable system requirements?
• How can survivability requirements be analyzed and evaluated in system architectures?
• What experience exists in dealing with survivability requirements?
• Is there a gap between research and industry practice, and if so, how can it be bridged?
• How can survivability requirements be dealt with in a proactive rather than reactive manner?
Panelist Position Statements
David Fisher, Software Engineering Institute.
My interest is in distributed systems and unbounded networks where survivability must be achieved in the presence of intelligent adversaries, rogue system components, and insider attacks, and where denial of service can be as important as security. We take as a given that the survivability of any single or small fixed number of system components cannot be guaranteed, and thus that survivability can be achieved only in the context of unbounded networks.
I take survivability to be the assured satisfaction of certain critical or essential requirements of the system's application or mission. Requirements for survivability are thus a subset of the system's overall requirements, and although fewer in number, are not characteristically different from those of the system as a whole. Survivability requirements often include the need for global nonfunctional properties that either cannot exist within individual components or whose local persistence is not maintainable. Also, in most systems where survivability is of concern, the requirements will include continuous operation and response within real-time constraints. Requirements for survivability, as with systems in general, also reflect constraints imposed by the characteristics of the target environment. In unbounded networks these include high communications costs and the absence of central control and global visibility. Our approach to solving survivability problems of this kind involves nonhierarchical decomposition, cooperation with minimal coordination, and autonomous local actions that ensure the emergence of desired global properties. The closest analogies are in genetic algorithms and biological systems.
John C. Knight, University of Virginia.
The problem with developing requirements for survivable systems has two parts. The first is the magnitude of the problem. The systems of which we speak are very large information systems often composed of many complex subsystems. A given system might be implemented by tens of millions of lines of software and have evolved over many years to include legacy systems from multiple sources. The systems that we want to survive are not developed from scratch but are the result of upgrades and enhancements over many years. How can one develop accurate and complete requirements for such a system? Existing techniques of modeling, enquiry, and analysis are up to the task of dealing with modest-sized systems developed in a fairly controlled environment, but not the very complex and changing circumstances of a critical infrastructure application.
The second part of the problem is the structure imposed by the idea of survivability.
A survivable system is one that provides prescribed services when presented with a variety of different environmental challenges. Thus, a survivable system might have to provide certain functionality normally, and different (but well-defined) functionality in the face of traumas such as equipment loss, software defects, operator errors, and so on. The various traumas with which the system is expected to deal must be enumerated and the required responses documented.
Thus a substantial burden is imposed on the requirements stage that is not normally present, since a hierarchy of requirements must be documented and the circumstances under which each is to be in effect must be determined. Dealing with these issues will require new approaches to requirements that provide for high-level modeling, accommodation of doubt about existing system elements, practical documentation of security requirements, and structures that support survivability.
Robyn Lutz, Iowa State University & Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
Recent experiences in building robust spacecraft offer some development tools and techniques that may be useful for the requirements definition of survivable systems. There is a key difference between spacecraft and survivable systems, in that mission-critical spacecraft requirements do not need to combat malicious attackers. However, spacecraft systems have in common with survivable systems requirements for continued autonomous operation and protection of critical data in a sometimes hostile and imperfectly understood environment (deep space).
Both spacecraft and survivable systems require a high degree of fault tolerance and often require that certain timing constraints be met under all foreseeable circumstances. In addition, rapidly changing technologies (robotics, innovative architectures, widely distributed nodes) offer similar requirements challenges in both domains.
Some of the methods that have helped define and validate requirements for spacecraft software are perhaps not as widely used as they merit in developing survivable systems. Many of these are well-known in safety-critical applications and have proven effective in producing robust spacecraft software. Among the methods with the greatest promise for transfer to survivable systems are early identification of hazards via early Software Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Software Fault Tree Analysis, and fault scenario generation; prioritization of requirements based on hazards classification; early formal specification of requirements in a notation formal enough to allow automated analysis of tradeoffs; formal proofs of key or novel aspects of the requirements; and early integration of fault monitoring and recovery strategies.
Jeffrey Voas, Reliable Software Technologies.
The notion of information system survivability has never been well-defined. I prefer to think of survivability as being a combination of secure and fault-tolerant. The two broad classes of events that can cripple a system to the point of being unusable are failure (from physical or logical anomalies) and malicious attack. Thus if a system were logically correct, could not be physically damaged or could not decay, and could not be maliciously tampered with, then I would argue that the system was highly survivable.
Developing a set of requirements that will enable a system to be completely survivable seems to me to be impossible. I'm aware of no instances where we have been able to produce requirements that lead to systems to be totally secure, correct, and safe (that were for systems that are as large and unbounded as the Internet). So I think it is more reasonable to begin tackling lesser goals in hopes of making progress toward the greater goal. I believe that we should first look at existing methods for producing fault-tolerant requirements. We should also look at approaches that produce requirements which guarantee that security policies cannot be violated. From there, we can assess gaps in the state-of-the-art that must be bridged in order to determine whether a set of requirements engender survivability. For example, it is clear that we will need taxonomies of common attack scenarios in order to demonstrate that a set of requirements can withstand such attacks. Further, we will need various levels of partitioning and redundancy between subsystems in case of physical threat. And we will need the standard "proof" abilities to demonstrate that we have not introduced logical errors in our systems that could cause our systems to self-destruct. Thus I believe that we must start from existing capabilities and not make the mistake of reinventing much of what exists that can be beneficial.
